13

TWO ESSAYS ON THE Ballance of *Europe*.

The FIRST written in *French* by the Late Archbishop of *Cambray*, and translated into *English*.

The SECOND by the Translator of the First Essay. viz. Mr. Wm. Grant Advocate at Edinburgh.

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ESSAY I.

SENTIMENTS ON THE Ballance of *EUROPE*.

Written by the late Archbiſhop of *Cambray*.

——*Fuit hæc Menſura Timoris*
Velle putant quodcunque poteſt. Lucan.

ESSAY I.

SENTIMENTS

ON THE

Balance of EUROPE

Written by the late Archbishop of Cambray.

Fuit hæc Mæcenas Tuorum
Vale patriæ quæ cæque potest. Lucan.

SENTIMENTS
ON THE
Ballance of *EUROPE.*

NEIGHBOURING States are not only oblig'd to obſerve towards each other the Rules of Juſtice and Publick Faith; but they are under a neceſſity, for the Security of each, and the common Intereſt of all, to maintain together a kind of Society and general Commonwealth: for the moſt powerful will certainly at length prevail, and overthrow the reſt, unleſs

leſs they unite together to preſerve the Ballance.

IT is not to be expected, among Men, that a ſuperiour Power will contain it ſelf within the Bounds of an exact Moderation, and that it will not employ its Force to obtain, for itſelf, what Advantages it can, by oppreſſing the Weaker. Or if this Power ſhould happen to be for ſome time harmleſs in the hands of an Excellent Prince, who could bear ſuch Proſperity ſo well, the Wonder 'tis likely would ceaſe with his Reign: for the natural Ambition of Princes, the Flatteries of their Courtiers, and the Prejudices of Nations themſelves, will not ſuffer us to believe that a People who had it in their power to ſubdue their Neighbours, would abſtain from it for any conſiderable time. A Reign conſpicuous for ſuch extraordinary Juſtice,

tice, would be the Ornament of Hiſtory, and a Prodigy not to be looked for again.

WE are then to expect, what in reality we ſee frequently happen, That every Nation will ſeek to prevail over its Neighbours; and therefore every Nation is obliged, for its proper Security, to watch againſt, and by all means reſtrain the Exceſſive Increaſe of Greatneſs in any of its Neighbours. Nor is this Injuſtice: 'Tis to preſerve it ſelf and its Neighbours from Servitude; 'tis to contend for the Liberty, Tranquillity and Happineſs of all in general: for the over-increaſe of Power in any one, influences the general Syſtem of all the ſurrounding Nations. Thus the ſucceſſive Changes which have happen'd in the Houſe of BURGUNDY, and which afterwards raiſed that of AUSTRIA, have

have alter'd the Face of Affairs throughout *Europe*. All *Europe* had reason to dread an Universal Monarchy under *Charles* V. especially after he had defeated and taken FRANCIS I. at *Pavia*. 'Tis certain that a Nation, having no Pretence directly to meddle with the Affairs of *Spain*, had at that time a very good Right to oppose that formidable Power which appear'd ready to swallow up all.

PRIVATE Men indeed have no Right to oppose the Increase of their Neighbour's Wealth, because they cannot pretend it may prove prejudicial or destructive to them. There are Laws and Magistrates to suppress Injustice and Violence among Families unequal in Power. But the Case of Commonwealths is different; the Over-growth of one of these may prove the Ruin and the Enslavement of

all

all its Neighbours. Here are neither Laws nor Judges eſtabliſh'd for a Barrier againſt the Invaſions of the Strongeſt; they have therefore reaſon to ſuppoſe that the Strongeſt will invade their Liberties, as ſoon as there is no Force ſufficient to oppoſe them. Each of 'em may and ought to prevent that Increaſe of Power, which would endanger the Liberty of his own People, and that of all his Neighbours. For Example, PHILIP II. of *Spain*, after he had conquer'd *Portugal*, would have made himſelf Maſter of *England*. 'Tis true, he had no Right that was well founded: but ſuppoſing his Right to have been inconteſtable, it was the Intereſt of all *Europe* to oppoſe his Eſtabliſhment in *England*; becauſe ſo powerful a Kingdom, added to his other Dominions of *Spain*, *Italy*, *Flanders*, and the *Indies*, would have enabled him to ſubject by his mari-

time Force all the other Powers of Christendom *. In that case the Rule

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* *The Example our Author brings is very proper. King* PHILIP *had in reality design'd to make himself an universal Monarch; and to that Design did we owe the Safety of Queen* ELIZABETH, *and consequently the Protestant Religion: For* PHILIP *would not consent to the Death of* ELIZABETH, *proposed by her Sister Queen* MARY, *thro a Zeal for the Catholick Religion; lest* MARY STUART, *who was marry'd to* FRANCIS II. *should become by Succession Queen of all* Great Britain, *and uniting it to* France, *should thereby form a Power which might frustrate his Design of Universal Monarchy. This is not the only Instance wherein this Political Maxim of the Ballance, and the mutual Jealousy of Catholick Powers, has prov'd the Security of the Protestant Interest in* Europe. *We have seldom seen a Popish Prince so zealous for his Religion, as to suffer his Rival to aggrandize himself by the Ruin of the Protestants. But we have sometimes seen even the Court of* Rome *itself trembling for fear of being crush'd under the over-grown Power of a Catholick Prince. That Court, it seems, is no less concern'd than others, in maintaining a Ballance of Power in Christendom. Yet this Predominancy of the Political above the Religious Views, in the Conduct of the States of* Europe, *does not make it altogether unnecessary for the Protestant Powers to maintain among them-*

Rule muſt have taken place of *Summum Jus*, *Summa Injuria*; and any particular Right by Succeſſion or Donation, muſt have given place to the natural Law that provides for the Security of ſo many Nations. Whatever deſtroys the juſt Ballance, or tends to ſet up an univerſal Monarchy, can be no other than unjuſt, however it may be founded on the written Laws of a particular Country, which can never take place in oppoſition to the ſovereign and univerſal Law of Nature for the Com-

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themſelves a kind of ſeparate virtual Union, for their Security, when there is occaſion, in the Exerciſe of their Religion; ſince there are ſometimes Catholick Princes weak enough to be miſled by their Clergy, and to overlook their Obligations and true Intereſts, in promoting their Faith by Perſecution. We have a preſent Example of this in Germany, *upon which the Proteſtant Powers have in reality acted in Concert, for the redreſs of their Brethrens Wrongs; and amongſt them (as is uſual on all Occaſions when the general Intereſt is concern'd) the King of* Great Britain *has acted a chief Part.*

mon Security and Liberty, engraven in the Hearts of all the Nations of the World.

WHEN a Power is grown to ſuch a Pitch, that all its Neighbours are hardly a Match for it, they have an undoubted Right to unite for the reſtraining of that Increaſe, which were it ſuffer'd to proceed, wou'd become too great to be oppos'd in its Attempts on the common Liberty. But that ſuch Confederacies for reſtraining the growing Power of a State may be lawful, the Danger from it muſt be real and preſſing; the League defenſive, or no farther offenſive than a juſt and neceſſary Defence requires; and ſuch Bounds muſt be ſet to it, as it may not entirely deſtroy that Power which it was form'd only to limit and moderate.

WE (in *France*) have now in view a possible * Event, when the Truth of what we have advanc'd will be apparent: It is, if the King of *Spain* shou'd happen to die without Issue. I suppose the Renunciation of the Queen to have been void, and that consequently we have a certain Right to the Succession of *Spain*. When once we are become Masters of *Spain*, we shall by consequence have *Portugal* in our power: All *Italy* will become a Province of our Kingdom by *Naples* and *Milan*; we shall be absolute Masters of the *Mediterranean*, by *Cadiz*, and the other Ports of *Spain*, by *Final*, *Gayetta*, *&c.* We shall have the Key of *Holland*, and ruin their Commerce by *Antwerp*. *Holland* being subdued without Resistance, we shall

* *This was written before the Death of the late King of* Spain.

be-

become Maſters of the Channel, and of all the Commerce of *Germany* and the Northern Parts: Nothing could hinder us, during ſome *Turkiſh* War, from ſubduing *Germany* it ſelf: *England* would be expoſed, with vaſtly inferior Force, to our Deſcents, and durſt not withſtand us: We ſhould be the Tyrants of all *Europe*. All *Europe* therefore has a Right to concur in excluding us from this Succeſſion, at the ſame time that we are entitled to it by written Laws.

THIS Care to maintain a kind of Equality and Ballance among neighbouring Nations, is that which ſecures the common Repoſe; and in this reſpect ſuch Nations, being join'd together by Commerce, compoſe, as it were, one great Body or Community. Chriſtendom, for example, makes a ſort of general Commonwealth, which has its Intereſts,

rests, its Dangers, and its Policy. All the Members of this great Body owe to one another for the common Good, and to themselves for their particular Security, that they oppose the Progress of any one Member, which may destroy the Ballance, and tend to the inevitable Ruin of the other Members. Whatever alters the general System of *Europe*, is dangerous, and draws after it many fatal Consequences. The House of *Austria* began under CHARLES V. to raise itself above that of *France*. What Wars did that produce! what Desolations in all *Europe*, until the Peace of *Vervins*! Afterwards the House of *France* became superiour by the Ministry of Cardinal RICHLIEU, and then by the Reign of the present King. In what Troubles and Mischiefs have we seen *Europe* involv'd above these thirty Years, and of the end

end of which we have yet no Prospect!

ALL neighbouring Nations are so connected together by their mutual Interests, that the least Progress of any one is sufficient to alter the general Ballance, which makes the Security of the whole; as when one Stone is taken out of an Arch, the whole falls to the Ground, because they sustain each other. 'Tis a Duty then as natural for neighbouring Nations to concur for the common Safety against one who grows too powerful, as it is for Fellow-Citizens to unite against an Invader of the Liberty of their Country. If there is a Duty owing by every Citizen to his particular Society or Country; every Nation, by the same reason, is oblig'd to consult the Welfare and Repose of that universal Publick, of which it is a Member.

THESE

THESE defenſive Alliances are then juſt and neceſſary, when they are in reality intended to prevent an exorbitant Power, ſuch as might be in a Condition to ſubdue all. Nor can that ſuperior Power juſtly come to a Rupture with the leſſer States, merely upon account of their defenſive Leagues, which it was their Right and their Duty to enter into. The Juſtice of theſe Leagues depends on their Circumſtances: They ſhou'd be founded on ſome Infractions of the Peace, or the Seizure of ſome Place of the Allies, or ſome certain Ground of the like nature: They ought likewiſe to be limited by ſuch Conditions as may prevent (what we have often ſeen) one Nation's pretending a neceſſity of reducing another which aſpires to univerſal Tyranny, only that it

ſelf may ſucceed in the ſame Deſign.

THE Addreſs, as well as Juſtice and Faith requir'd in making Treaties of Alliance, is to frame them as plain as poſſible, and as remote from an equivocal Meaning, and exactly calculated for procuring a certain Benefit which you wou'd immediately be poſſeſs'd of. You muſt take care that the Engagements you lay your ſelf under, do not reduce your Enemy too low, and prove too beneficial to your Ally; which may lay you under a neceſſity either to ſuffer what may be ruinous to you, or to violate your Engagements. And of theſe 'tis hard to determine which is more fatal.

LET us proceed to reaſon upon theſe Principles, applying them to Chriſ-

Chriſtendom, in which we are moſt intereſted.

THERE are only four Caſes, or Conditions, in which a State may be ſuppos'd to be, with reſpect to its Share of Power in *Europe*.

THE Firſt is, when it has a Force ſuperiour to the reſt, who nevertheleſs uniting together, make a Counterpoiſe to it: Such has been the Caſe of *France* during the preſent Reign.

THE Second is, when it has a Force abſolutely ſuperiour to that of all the other united Powers: Such was that of the *Romans*, and that of CHARLES the Great.

THE Third is, when it has a Force inferiour to another, but ſupports it ſelf by an Union with the

reſt of its Neighbours againſt the predominant Power.

LASTLY, the Fourth is, when it has a Force nearly equal to that of another neighbouring State, together with which it maintains all in Peace, by a kind of Ballance, which it preſerves without Ambition, and with exact Faith.

THE State of the *Romans* and of CHARLES the Great, is by no means eligible. Firſt, becauſe to arrive at it, you muſt commit all manner of Injuſtice and Violence; ſeize what is not your own, and that by the moſt bloody and continu'd Wars. Then, the Deſign is very dangerous: States have often periſh'd by theſe ambitious Follys; *Spain* is a very lively and recent Example of this. And, laſtly, vaſt Empires, which have been form'd by means of ſo many Miſchiefs, are gene-

generally the Occaſion of others yet more dreadful, by their Fall. The firſt Minority, or weak Reign, diſſolves the overgrown Body, and ſeparates the People, yet unaccuſtom'd to the Yoke of Subjection, or to an entire Union. Then what Diviſions, what Confuſions, what Anarchys, without Remedy! To be ſenſible of this, we need only reflect on the Miſchiefs brought on the Weſt, by the ſudden Downfal of the Empire of CHARLES the Great; and on the Eaſt, by the Subverſion of that of ALEXANDER, whoſe Captains made greater havock in ſharing the Spoils of his Victory, than he had done in the Conqueſt of *Aſia*. This then is of all the Caſes the moſt dazzling and fallacious, and the moſt fatal in its Conſequences to thoſe who arrive at it.

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THE Second Caſe is that of a Power ſuperiour to any one of the reſt, who all together make a Ballance againſt it. The Advantage lies on the ſide of the ſuperiour Power, in that it is united, ſimple, not ſubject to controul, uniform and certain in its Meaſures. But if it be not able to diſunite the reſt, by exciting Jealouſys among them, it muſt at length be overpower'd, and all its ſuperiour Force dwindle away; 'tis expos'd to ſo many unlook'd for Accidents within itſelf, or to be ſuddenly overthrown by Invaſions from abroad. Then it exerts itſelf to no purpoſe in deſtructive Efforts for a Superiority, which can afford it no real Advantage, and which expoſes it to all manner of Diſgraces and Dangers. This is certainly the moſt wretched State of all, eſpecially becauſe the utmoſt the moſt ſurprizing Proſperity can give

give it, is that it ſhou'd paſs into that Firſt Condition which we have already found to be unjuſt and pernicious.

THE Third Caſe is that of a Power inferiour to another, which yet being united with the reſt of *Europe*, makes a Ballance againſt the ſuperiour, and becomes the Security of all the leſſer States. This Condition has its Inconveniencys, but 'tis leſs hazardous than the former; becauſe 'tis on the defenſive, it waſtes itſelf leſs, it has its Allies, and is generally in that State of Inferiority, void of the blind inconſiderate Preſumption which is incident to the Fortunate, and ſo often brings on the Fall of the moſt proſperous States. Provided the inferiour State be diſcreet and moderate, firm to its Allies, and cautious not to give them the leaſt Ground of Miſtruſt,

nor

nor to do any thing but in concert with them, and for the common Good; it will be able to contend with the ſuperiour Power, and at length reduce it.

THE Fourth Caſe is that of a Power equal to another, with which it maintains the Ballance, thro a Regard to the Publick Security. This Condition, without any ambitious Attempts to alter it, is the wiſeſt and happieſt of all: You are the common Arbiter; all your Neighbours are your Friends; or ſuch as are not ſo, are therefore ſuſpected by the reſt: You do nothing which does not appear to have been intended for the Good of your Neighbours, as well as of your own People: You add daily to your own Strength; and when at length you come (as you cannot fail by a wiſe Government to do) to have more Force at home, and more Al-

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liances abroad than the Power which is jealous of yours, then you muſt eſtabliſh the more that prudent Moderation with which you have ever maintain'd the Ballance for the common Security, and be ever mindful of the Miſchiefs which are caus'd by great Conqueſts in the conquering State itſelf, as well as in the vanquiſh'd, of the Danger of attempting them in vain, of the Vanity, Injuſtice, and ſhort Duration of great Empires, with the Calamitys which attend their Fall.

BUT as it is not to be expected that a Power ſuperiour to all others, can long maintain itſelf at that height, it wou'd become a wiſe and juſt Prince not to be ambitious of tranſmitting ſuch a Power to his Succeſſors, who probably will not be ſo moderate as himſelf, nor ſo able to bear a continual and violent Temptation of

eſtabliſhing to himſelf a more ſenſible Superiority. For the Good therefore of his Succeſſors and his People, he ought to confine himſelf to ſome Equality with his Neighbours.

'TIS true, there are different kinds of Superiority: One is External, and conſiſts in Extent of Territorys, the number of fortify'd Places, and the Poſſeſſion of Paſſes into the neighbouring Countrys, *&c.* This proves a Temptation to Enterprizes as fatal to the Poſſeſſor of it, as to his Neighbours; and excites againſt him Hatreds, Jealouſys, and Confederacys.

THE other kind of Superiority is Inward and Subſtantial; it conſiſts in a more numerous People, better diſciplin'd, and more skilful in Agriculture and other neceſſary Arts. This kind of Superiority is generally

ly the eaſieſt attain'd, the ſureſt, the leaſt expos'd to the Envy and Combinations of its inferiour Neighbours, and more proper than numerous Conqueſts, and fortify'd Places, to render a People invincible. A State cannot too diligently aſpire to this Superiority, nor too carefully avoid the former, which has no other than a falſe Luſtre.

ESSAY II.

REFLECTIONS ON THE Foregoing SENTIMENTS.

By the Tranſlator of the Firſt Eſſay.

Una & ea vetus cauſa bellandi eſt profunda Cupido Imperii & Divitiarum. Saluſt.

Nunquam ſatis fida Potentia ubi nimia eſt. Tacit.

REFLECTIONS
ON THE
Foregoing Sentiments.

THERE is not, I believe, any Doctrine in the Law of Nations, of more certain Truth, of greater and more general Importance to the Prosperity of Civil Society, or that Mankind has learnt at a dearer rate, than this of the *Ballance of Power*; which the Author of the preceding Treatise maintains by a lively Representation,

tation, and proper Examples of its Neceſſity.

IT may be demonſtrated to have ariſen neceſſarily, and from the Reaſon and Nature of things, as a Cure of what happen'd amiſs in human Affairs, before the Riſe, and during the Progreſs of Civil Society; and to be as agreeable to the Principles of the Law of Nations, as it is to the preſent Policy, and general Practice of *Europe*.

THAT ambitious Propenſity in Man, which the Author lays down as the Foundation of his Doctrine, and which makes the Ballance neceſſary, has been, in reality, extant in the World from the earlieſt times. Perhaps it wou'd not be going too far back for its Original, to obſerve that it was an Affectation of Dignity or Excellence above his allotted Share,

Share, that was the Occaſion of Man's firſt Fall, and brought Ill into the World. This at leaſt is true, that according to one, and that not the leaſt probable Opinion concerning the Riſe of Civil Society, it was owing to this very human Frailty. For whatever may be ſaid of the natural Inclinations of Man to Society, and the many Conveniencys of Life, which he enjoys by the means of it; ſome of the moſt learned are of opinion, that tho Societys were form'd in different places, and at different times, for various Reaſons, yet the firſt had its riſe from the Ambition of ſome aſpiring Spirit, who made himſelf a Sovereign by Force; and that others following his Example, or fearing to be oppreſs'd by him in their ſeparate State, aſſociated for their common Safety, and choſe themſelves a Chief.

AND well was it perhaps for Mankind, that they were then but rude in the Art of preſerving the Ballance: For had thoſe independent Fathers of Familys, inſtead of uniting into one Society, choſen our way of Confederacy or League to protect themſelves from the Violences of their Neighbour-Sovereign, they might have remain'd ſome Ages longer in that State of Nature, and in their primitive Ignorance of Laws and Conſtitutions, Arts and Sciences, Commerce, and all thoſe invaluable Benefits, which are the happy Effects (if the Proſpect of them was not, in many Inſtances, the Occaſion) of Man's entring into Society.

IT is yet more generally agreed, that the frequent Effects of the tyrannical Paſſions among private Perſons,

ſons, were the Occaſion of the firſt Civil Unions: For it ſeems, even in thoſe early times, when Luxury was yet unknown, and the Deſires and Wants of Men were few, the perverſe Diſpoſitions of ſome of the Race diſcover'd themſelves in an unjuſt Diſturbance of their Neighbour's Peace, and Invaſion of his Property; which made it neceſſary, for the Security of the milder and weaker, that they ſhou'd unite in Society, and chuſe a Chief, who might adminiſter Juſtice among them, and ſettle their ſeveral Rights and Pretenſions, or lead them to repel the Aſſaults of their Enemys.

IT may be obſerv'd on this occaſion, that 'tis from a certain univerſal Senſe of this ambitious Depravity in Man, and of the Value of whatever conduces to preſerve a Ballance, that the fabulous Heroes of

antient times have been repreſented as employing their Vertue to deliver the Oppreſs'd, and to ſubdue Beaſts, Monſters, and Tyrants, thoſe Enemys of the common Repoſe and Safety.

WHEN Men were thus united to protect themſelves from the Violences to which they were expos'd in their defenceleſs State, they ſoon became able to make a farther uſe of their Union. They wou'd then confer about their Wants, and engage their Inventions to provide for the Conveniencys of many kinds they ſtood in need of. They wou'd diſcover the rude Beginnings of Laws, Arts, and Commerce; and for ſome time reap the Sweets of Security and Conveniency in their Infant-States.

BUT in that unexperienc'd State they foreſaw not the Miſchiefs which

reſtleſs

reſtleſs Ambition was yet to cauſe among them, in ſucceeding times; any more than the Improvements in the Art of human Life which were to be made. The Luſt of Power remain'd in the Heart of Man, and found out new ways to exert itſelf. It produc'd Tyrants in particular States, and Conquerors over many.

NOR cou'd it otherwiſe fall out in thoſe earlier Ages of Society: For while the ſeveral little States, fearleſs of any Dangers, other than they had provided againſt by their late Union, were intent on their private Concerns, and the Improvement of their new Condition, without minding what paſs'd at a diſtance from their own Borders, and ignorant how far they were intereſted in the Fate of their remoter Neighbours; it was eaſy for an ambitious Prince,

Prince, by unjuſt Attempts upon the Liberty, firſt of one Neighbour, and then of another, to enlarge his uſurp'd Dominion over many more of the inferiour Communitys, than wou'd have been able jointly to cruſh his firſt Attempts againſt them. But the Ballance of Power among Nations was then unknown. No Correſpondence was maintain'd among Neighbouring States, nor Confederacys form'd for its Preſervation. And thus came poor Mankind, for many Ages, to be held in ſubjection under the unlimited Greatneſs and tyrannical Power of ſeveral ſucceſſive univerſal Monarchys; which in their Turns, brought upon the World, in their Riſe, and while they flouriſh'd, and by their Fall, the innumerable conſequent Miſchiefs of ſuch an unnatural State.

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ONE might (if there were occaſion) here enter into a ſpacious Field of Learning, to bring from Hiſtory the particular Proofs of theſe Reflections; and to inquire into the Attempts which were ſometimes made towards maintaining a Ballance of Power, eſpecially in *Greece*. But that wou'd exceed the deſign'd Compaſs of this ſhort Eſſay. 'Tis certain however, that the Doctrine was never brought to its Perfection, nor fully eſtabliſh'd, till in theſe laſt Ages, after the Experience of ſo many former, among the *European* Nations.

NOW the Caſe is the ſame among neighbouring States, which are with reſpect to each other in a State of Nature, that it was among the independent Fathers of Familys before Society. The only Security againſt the Ambition of the Powerful,

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is the Confederacy and Union of the Weaker. As in both Caſes the Diſturbance and Breach of the Ballance ariſes from the ſame Cauſe, the Remedy and Preſervation muſt be found in the ſame manner. And thus we are brought, by a View of the natural and uniform Courſe of things, to diſcern the Juſtice of our Author's Sentiments, and to acknowledge the naturally civil and political State of Mankind, with the neceſſity of a general Society of the particular States, for the Security of all.

AND as the firſt Societys of ſingle Men afforded them not Safety only, but many Advantages and Conveniencys of Life, of which they were deſtitute in their ſeparate State; ſo, in this general Society of Mankind, by a continual Intercourſe of Nations, and an univerſal Commerce, every one reaps the Benefit of the

Inven-

Inventions and Products of all, and the Art of human Life is brought to Perfection. Which ſince, without ſuch Commerce, it had never been, we might from hence alone argue for our Union of diſtinct Societys: No Country being abſolute and compleat in itſelf, but abounding with a ſuperfluity of certain Commoditys, and wanting others equally conducive to its Welfare; which plainly diſcovers the Relation it bears to other Countrys, or to the States by whom they are inhabited.

NOR is this Aſſemblage of ſeparate, independent States, the leſs to be accounted one Society, or connected Syſtem, becauſe there is no actual Union among them, as by an univerſal Alliance, or common Head; that being by no means neceſſary to eſtabliſh ſuch a national Brotherhood, or general Publick, as we are endea-

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vouring to diſcover in the World. 'Tis ſufficient that the neighbouring Societys are of one common Nature, and are provided for by one Order or Conſtitution of things ſubſiſting together, and cooperating towards the Conſervation and Support of them all. There is one common Rule, as certain as the written Laws of any particular Country, by which their Nature, and their Conduct towards each other, may be clearly determin'd. They cannot ſubſiſt or be provided for compleatly, without a continual Intercourſe and Communication of Benefits: And they can be no otherwiſe ſecur'd from the Effuſion of Blood, the Devaſtations of Provinces, the Shock and Ruin of Kingdoms, which have been occaſion'd, in former Times, by thoſe ambitious Attempts upon the Liberty of the World, which ended in the univerſal Monarchys.

HERE

HERE is then our general Society eſtabliſh'd, in the ſame manner that were the firſt ſingle ones, by a ſocial Ligue, Confederacy, and mutual Conſent, founded in a common Good or Intereſt, which joins the Members of the Community, and makes them one.

ALL the Members of this great Body are oblig'd to promote the common Intereſt, and as much as in them lies, to prevent all Damages and Inconveniencys to each other; and therefore to act in concert againſt ſuch a Power of any one as wou'd enable him to tyrannize over the reſt. And that they may do this, when the dreaded Power is unlawful, or in reality abus'd in any of the Inſtances mention'd by our Author among the Limitations of his Doctrine, (as by the Infraction of the Peace, the

Seizure of ſome Place not his own, or the like) no one will deny. But whether the bare ſuſpicion of Ill from a Power capable by a rightfully acquired Strength to inflict it, be a juſt Cauſe of uſing Force to prevent its farther Growth, or future Injury, may be juſtly call'd in queſtion. For the moſt celebrated Writers on the Law of Nations agree in this, that (as in the Caſe of private Perſons in the State of Nature) the Fear of Harm from the too great Power of a State, gives the reſt no right to take Arms for reducing it, unleſs there be ſuch evident Signs of a real Intention of injuring them as amount to a moral Certainty of their Danger; that they are to ſuppoſe the ſuperiour Power will contain itſelf within due Bounds, till the contrary appear; and that they are to provide againſt uncertain Dangers, not by Force, but by allowable and harmleſs Cautions,

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as by fortifying themſelves, and uniting together. And this is moſt certainly true in all ordinary Caſes, when there is no very exorbitant Superiority of one above the reſt: yet it may not be utterly repugnant to our Author's Opinion in this latter Caſe.

HE aſſerts that when a State is grown to ſuch a Pitch, that all its Neighbours are hardly a Match for it, tho it was not without a Title to that dangerous Acceſs of Power, yet the reſt have a right by Force to oppoſe the Proſecution of that Title, and to retrench that Power, which wou'd otherwiſe be in a Condition to enſlave them all, or make them hold their precarious Liberty at its Diſcretion. He ſeems to think that in Caſes of ſuch Extremity as thoſe of the Examples he produces, when a State becomes formidable to its Neighbours by a great Acceſſion of

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new Dominions, the frequent Experience of Mankind's being ambitious and enterprizing in proportion to their Power, is alone a ſufficient moral Certainty of their Danger, to juſtify the uſe of Force, and the Violation of the ſubordinate private Right, in providing for their common Security. He adds many neceſſary Limitations of this bold Opinion: That actual Combinations of this kind, are not to be made without juſt Ground, a real and imminent Danger; that they are not to proceed to offenſive Violence againſt the dreaded Power, unleſs it be neceſſary for their own Defence; nor to retrench it further than the Care of their common Safety requires.

HIS Opinion thus ſtated, may perhaps be defended upon that Principle on which he places it, to wit, the

the ſovereign Regard which is due to the Good of the whole Body, of which every particular State is a Part. 'Tis evident that any Member which is in a Condition that may be deſtructive to the reſt, is, with reſpect to this Order or Oeconomy of neighbouring States, a publick Calamity, which needs Redreſs for the Good of the whole. Such a one cannot more juſtly complain of the retrenching his Exorbitancy, than cou'd that Man who abounded in Plenty, on his being robb'd of a Morſel of Bread by a Perſon ready to ſtarve for Hunger, and who was compell'd to uſe that Violence for his own Preſervation. Nor can he more juſtly claim the Exerciſe of his pernicious Title, than a Madman can claim the Reſtitution of an Inſtrument of Death which he had depoſited in the Hands of another Man; ſince in both Caſes equally, the Poſſeſſion of the private Right

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may prove hurtful and deſtructive to the Publick. 'Tis as reaſonable in this Caſe, as we ſee it in many Inſtances in Nature, that there ſhou'd be a Sacrifice of Intereſts; that the Part ſhou'd be ſubjected to the Whole; and that one Member ſhou'd be reſign'd to the Advantage of the whole Body, and contribute by its private Injury to the Preſervation and Happineſs of all in general.

THUS we ſee how the juſtifiable Practice of our Author's Doctrine depends on a *diſcreet Juſtice* to the private Right, and a *moderate Zeal* for the publick Good; that neither any needleſs Violation of the firſt be committed, nor any thing deſtructive of that Ballance by which the general Society is upheld, may on any account, or under any pretence of private Right, be advanc'd or proſecuted, which can be no other than

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unjuſt in the Whole, however it may be founded in the particular Rights of a certain Part.

THE Doctrine of the Ballance being eſtabliſhed, our Author examines, by theſe Principles, the Condition of any *European* Nation in the various Degrees of Power it may be poſſeſs'd of. His Caſes may be conſidered as ſeveral Diſpoſitions of Power in the Whole, as well as ſo many Conditions of any one Nation. And in this View, his Explanation of his fourth Caſe is ſomewhat obſcure: for it does not appear at firſt ſight, that he ſpeaks of two Powers (as the Houſes of *Auſtria* and *Bourbon*) of conſiderable Force in *Europe*, that are jealous of each other, and watchful to prevent the leaſt Acceſſion of Greatneſs to its Rival; and ſo prove the Security of the reſt by their mutual Emulation. While they continue thus nearly equal, and neither is am-

bitious to become Greater, they are not only themſelves in a happy Condition, but make their Neighbours ſafer, during that Diſpoſition of Power, than they cou'd be by a Union againſt a mighty Potentate equal to them all together. The Reaſon is that the inferior united Powers are not always diſcreet and faithful and zealous for their common Good. There may be one of them guided by evil Counſellors, who will for their private Intereſt hinder their Prince to concur with his Neighbours for the general Good; or a Prince may find it difficult to raiſe the neceſſary Supplys for his Proportion of the united Strength; or he may be weak enough to neglect the Danger, becauſe 'tis at ſome Diſtance from his own Countrys; or he may be prevail'd on by the Practices of the predominant Power to break off from the Alliance. Now while there happens to be in *Europe* two ſuch great Powers,

Powers, from either of which alone the reſt wou'd be in Danger, but which are thus watchful over one another; the Liberty of the inferior States is eaſily and effectually ſecur'd. But when one of them becomes conſiderably ſuperior to the other, or ambitiouſly diſturbs the publick Tranquillity, the reſt muſt come in to aid the Weaker, and reſtore the Ballance.

OUR Author, in his Reflections on theſe Caſes as of one certain Nation, concludes that to be the happieſt, when its Power is moderate, employ'd for the common Good, and ariſes from the inward Proſperity of its own People, without attempting on the Liberty of its Neighbours.

AND from hence there ariſes a further Reſemblance between the Caſe of ſingle Perſons, and that of Commonwealths; that there is a virtuous or vicious Conduct in the State,

as well as in the private Man, which influences alike their Condition by its natural Operation, in caufing Happinefs or Mifery. This Propofition may appear over-refin'd and philofophical; but after what has been already examin'd may be eafily explain'd. We have feen above, many Inftances of this Refemblance: That, as every fingle Man, fo a Community of Men is naturally oblig'd to uphold a Union and Correfpondence with its Fellows: That it has it's Intereftes, and its Dutys, in this great Society, to be car'd for, and perform'd: That it may be difcreet or imprudent in its Conduct towards the reft. In the fame manner, it may be juft or unjuft, a good Neighbour and Member, which obferves exactly that Law, and thofe Orders on which this extended Correfpondence and common Intereft is eftablifh'd; or fuch a one as feeks rather the Harm than the Good of that

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Whole in which it is included. Now if what our Author advances be true, in his Preference of what he makes his Fourth Caſe of a Nation, the juſt and virtuous State, we ſee, is the only happy one. And there will hence appear a very remarkable Harmony with that Fundamental Truth in Morality, " That Virtue is the " natural Good, and Vice the Miſery " and Ill of every Man." And the Reaſon and Ground of this Truth, aſſign'd by the great Maſters in Morality, will not be a leſs proper and delightful Conſideration, with reſpect to our Subject. It is, That Man, being by his particular OEconomy fitted to the ſtricteſt Society, and Rule of common Good, the Wiſdom of that which rules in Nature, has ſo diſpos'd, that for him to operate, as is by Nature appointed him, towards the Good of ſuch his Society or Whole, is in reality to purſue his own natural and proper Good; and that

that to operate contrariwiſe, or by ſuch Affections as ſever from that common Good or Publick Intereſt, is, in reality, to work towards his own natural and proper Ill. Such likewiſe is the Nature, and ſo it happens in the Caſe of a whole Nation.

AND if at all times the Obſervation would not hold good, 'tis true at leaſt as the Affairs of *Europe* are now conſtituted. For we are now in an Age when our Society at large is fram'd, a Connexion of the whole preſerv'd, and the Ballance and Liberty of *Europe* univerſally regarded with the greateſt Caution. And we are our ſelves the happy Nation, who ever ſince the firm Security of our own Libertys by ſettling a Ballance of Power between our Prince and People, have not only enjoy'd thoſe Bleſſings at home, but by our Greatneſs and Power given Life and

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Vigour to their Cauſe abroad. We were the Head and Chief of the *European* League, founded on this common Cauſe, to reduce the Exorbitancy of a neighbouring Prince, who threatned the World with a univerſal Monarchy. Nor can we loſe this noble Ardour, or quit the glorious Toil, whilſt we are under the wiſe Government of a King, whoſe chiefeſt Care is to make his People happy; and yet with an extenſive Goodneſs ſeeks the Benefit of all, and affects the Intereſt and Proſperity of the World.

HE ever carefully applys himſelf to purſue the Maxims of his Predeceſſors, eſpecially thoſe which tend to keep him in Peace and Friendſhip with the other Powers of *Europe*, and to cultivate Commerce with them for mutual Advantage. He acts in concert with his Neighbours, to bring about the great Schemes he has

has form'd for the Tranquillity of *Europe*; and has already, to this noble Purpose, form'd a mighty Alliance, and engag'd in it the same Power which was, not long ago, so formidable to all *Europe*, and might soon, with recruited Strength, prove so again. He now provides for an effectual Security against its Union with another Power, which appear'd lately capable of being alone dangerous to the rest, and might have prov'd so, had it not been prevented, and reduc'd by his timely Interposition. Nor is he less sollicitous to quiet the Troubles in the Northern Parts, occasion'd chiefly by a powerful Prince, who has but newly rais'd his People from Barbarity, and brought them into the general Society of *Europe*; and yet has already made such ambitious Attemps on every side, as prove sufficiently what a watchful Eye the rest must keep upon him. The King has wisely sav'd from his

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Oppreſſion the poor Remains of a once flouriſhing Proteſtant Kingdom; and will, we hope, ſucceed in his Endeavours to reſtrain within due Bounds the Power of that Monarch, and ſettle a general Peace.

IN fine, one cannot read our Author's Deſcription of his fourth and happieſt Caſe of a Nation, and not obſerve with Pleaſure, that our King's Character and Conduct are perfectly adapted to make Him that glorious Prince, and us that happy People; while, at the ſame time, his Moderation, and our own Situation and excellent Conſtitution, give us a full Security from the only Danger of ſuch a proſperous State, the Abuſe of it by oppreſſing our Neighbours. For we who taſte the moſt of Liberty at home, and are the chief Maintainers of the Ballance abroad, are of all People the moſt ſenſible, that a Nation who ſhould go about to

make itſelf abſolute over its Neighbours, would ſeek a State of all other the moſt horrid, oppreſſive and miſerable; that every Step towards it is unjuſt, a Breach of Intereſt, and leads to the greateſt Ills: As on the other ſide, every thing which is an Improvement of Commerce, or an Eſtabliſhment of Liberty and the Ballance, is an Advancement of the common Intereſt, and leads to the greateſt and moſt ſolid Happineſs of Civil Society.